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THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER

A REVIEW OF SOVIET WRITING
ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA



PRICE SEVEN SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE

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THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER

Vol.III No.8 September 1961

The Mizan Newsletter aims at giving an objective and balanced account of current Soviet writings on the Middle East and Africa

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The first article in this issue is an account of Soviet press treatment of the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in Belgrade.

MIDDLE EAST

A Soviet View of Nasir's Economic Measures is an account of a PRAVDA correspondent's views of the nationalization and land reform measures in the USSR. While giving praise where praise is thought to be due, he points out at the same time that these measures do not constitute true "socialism".

A Russian Visitor's Comments on the Press in Iraq is a translation of an article deploring the suppression of the "democratic" press in Iraq.

The Soviet View of Dr. Mosaddeq and the National Front in Persia points out how, in Soviet eyes, Dr. Mosaddeq is regarded as a "bourgeois" politician, "afraid of his own people", who in 1951-3 prevented the success of a promising "anti-imperialist" movement in Persia which might have led to a pro-Soviet orientation of Persia's foreign policy.

The Middle East in the Soviet Press includes an account of the "CENTO secret documents" made public in Moscow, and the propaganda campaign for which they have provided the material.

AFRICA

Soviet Views on Eurafrica is an account of the various arguments used by Soviet writers in an attempt to denigrate plans for economic union between African and Western European countries.

Africa in the Soviet Press includes Soviet reports on the Congo, Tunisia and the visits of President Nkrumah and President Abbud to Moscow.

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THE CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES: SOVIET PRESS TREATMENT

Although the preparations for the Belgrade Conference of Non-Aligned Countries received little notice in the Soviet press, the conference itself was given extensive coverage, and PRAVDA's reports on the speeches and resolutions were far fuller than those appearing in most Western newspapers. For PRAVDA the conference was covered by two special correspondents, V. Mayevskiy and B. Tarasov, and for IZVESTIYA by N. Karev.

Khrushchev's message of greetings to the conference (PRAVDA 2.9.61) spoke of its "work in the great cause of preserving peace on earth". For the Government and peoples of the Soviet Union peaceful coexistence was the very foundation of their foreign policy; "that is why they warmly approve and support all steps aimed at thwarting the forces of war." The present actions of these "increasingly active forces of aggression and revenge" differed little from what happened 20 years ago. "We know that the peoples of Asian, African and Latin American countries who were formerly in the chains of colonial slavery and who have now awakened and flexed their mightly shoulders are raising their voice with other peoples in favour of peace, national independence and freedom."

PRAVDA's first dispatch on the conference (2.9.61) stated that, after the Bandung Conference and last year's UN General Assembly session, the Belgrade Conference with about 30 countries taking part was "one of the most representative". PRAVDA reported President Sukarno's speech at some length, and in particular his repudiation of the idea that the newly independent countries were threatened by a "new colonialism from other countries" (the Communist bloc countries).

N. Karev in IZVESTIYA (2.9.61) said that the Soviet statement on the continuation of nuclear tests was "in the centre of attention" of delegates and of the press. It was natural that the prospect of fresh atomic explosions should not please the representatives of African and Asian states, "but they understand the reasons which have impelled the Soviet Union to this step". A "highly placed representative of one of the NATO countries" had appeared in Belgrade to ascertain the opinion of conference participants about the Soviet statement. A group of African delegates had made this quite clear to him. "The opinion of the Africans is not in favour of the countries of the aggressive North Atlantic bloc." They blamed the NATO leaders for their "atomic arms race" and for France's atomic tests, which had compelled the Soviet Union to take counter-measures. "It is necessary to redouble efforts in the struggle for peace, against those who conduct the arms race - such is the conclusion of many conference participants." PRAVDA (3.9.61) noted that Dr. Nkrumah had called the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests "a shock", but had added that it was a shock which forced one to realize the full seriousness of the situation and the need for measures to safeguard peace.

PRAVDA published excerpts from speeches on colonialism (4.9.61) and on the need to change the structure of the UN (5.9.61). On the German question, the most fully reported speech was that of Marshal Tito, but Soviet correspondents noted with approval other speakers' emphasis on the need to recognize both Germanies and on the need for a German peace treaty. An excerpt from Premier Nehru's speech included his statement that he was very glad that Khrushchev had affirmed that access to West Berlin would not be limited but would remain open to the Western powers as now.

Western reactions to the conference were the subject of various comments, the main conclusion of which was that the West was disappointed with the attitude and pronouncements of conference delegates. An early PRAVDA dispatch from Belgrade (3.9.61) said that "some of the American and West German cold war troubadours present here" had tried to start an anti-Soviet campaign over the Soviet nuclear tests decision; but the conference participants had refused to lend any support to this "hysterical campaign", and their prouncements had shown their realistic attitude to present problems and their serious desire to make their contribution to the strengthening of world peace. Later (6.9.61) PRAVDA said that the premier of a certain small country, a few hours before he was to address the conference, had received a telegram from the premiers of two NATO countries giving him to understand that he was either not to make his speech at all or, if he did, he was to say nothing that would damage the interests of Bonn; should he do so, all economic assistance to his country would be suspended. But such blackmail, said PRAVDA, "will not save the West German revenge-seekers"; as West German newspapers had admitted, the attitude of the conference, whose participants counted for more than 25 per cent of UN votes, was a bitter disappointment for Bonn.

US press reactions were particularly noted. PRAVDA (7.9.61) quoted the NEW YORK TIMES as observing that "the non-aligned countries feel the need to incline to Moscow's point of view on the problems of Berlin and disarmament", and that in considering the neutral countries' requests for US aid Washington would have to study their attitude to various international problems. Later (9.9.61) PRAVDA said that in the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE Marguerite Higgins, "a scurrilous columnist well known for her slanderous attacks on Afro-Asian leaders", had given vent to her feelings on the subject of Presidents Sukarno and Modibo Keita, who were visiting Washington to give President Kennedy a message from the conference. The DAILY NEWS had called this action by the conference "effrontery", and had called for "a very cool reception for Sukarno" as being "an uninvited, unnecessary and unwanted guest".

In short, the Soviet press has presented the Belgrade Conference as an endorsement of Soviet policy which is welcomed in the Soviet Union and is bitterly resented in the West.

M I D D L E E A S T

NASIR'S ECONOMIC MEASURES: A SOVIET VIEW

Hitherto the declared socialist ideals of the UAR regime have been referred to only slightingly by Soviet commentators (see MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.7 of 1960, pp. 1-6 and No.6 of 1961, p.6). They have usually mentioned them only to contrast them with the realities of peasant and working-class poverty, capitalist domination of the economy and (as during the recent Soviet-UAR press and radio controversy) alleged "persecution of progressive elements" in the UAR. However, after the announcement of the recent far-reaching measures of nationalization, land reform and state economic control in the UAR, some authoritative Soviet comment was clearly called for which, while giving praise where praise was thought to be due, would at the same time point out that these measures did not constitute true socialism in the Soviet sense of the word. Such a comment was provided by PRAVDA, in an article by its special correspondent V. Mayevskiy, who had recently visited Cairo and Alexandria.

Mayevskiy begins by referring to projects already put in hand by the UAR Government, such as the project for irrigation and settlement of At-Tahrir province, and agrarian reform measures taken hitherto, which he says have "only partially changed the situation in the countryside", since many landlords still possess vast holdings as before and millions of peasants remain landless and in poverty. "The bourgeoisie strengthened its positions. Flouting of the law by the monopolists, speculation, bribery and corruption were undermining the state. This could not fail to cause deep discontent. The slogans of the revolution had promised to put an end to imperialism, feudalism and the rule of capital and to guarantee social justice and democracy."

After a brief outline of the nationalization and agrarian reform decrees promulgated on 20th and 25th July, Mayevskiy discusses UAR public reaction to them, and makes some comments of his own.

"In Cairo and Alexandria we witnessed the satisfaction with which the working people greeted the news of these decrees. They want to believe that transforming them into reality will mean strengthening the national economy and the state sector, a weakening of the dictates of large private capital, a further attack on the position of large landowners, and an

improvement in the life of the national masses. The people of the UAR want to see in these reforms some step towards socialism. And this is natural.

"In our times the attractive force of the idea of socialism is irrefutable. No sober-minded politician, especially in Asia and Africa, can turn to his people with a call to build a capitalist society. Capitalism is the way to national suffering. Only the President of the USA and some of his confederates openly call for the strengthening of capitalism. Often even those who try to strengthen the power of capital talk of 'socialism'. But what a lot of kinds of socialism there are now! In one of the young African countries they even proclaim 'lyrical socialism'. The fact is, however, that there are no different types of socialism. There exists only one real socialism, based on Marxist-Leninist teaching and proved by the great experience of the Soviet land and other socialist countries. Socialism means the liquidation of exploiting classes and of the causes of exploitation of man by man. The path to it is well known: it is the socialist revolution and genuine democracy, that is the rule of the working class in close union with the working peasantry and the intelligentsia which serves the people.

"In Cairo we had occasion to read articles in which the author claimed that the decrees of President Nasir on the one hand mean the building of 'Arab national cooperative socialism' and on the other have nothing in common with Communism. 'Obviously it is not Communism', exclaimed Ibrahim Nawar in the newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH. 'The landowners remain the owners of the land, householders retain their property, the capitalists remain masters of their money. The state has only limited their profits... Where is the Communism here?'

"We can indeed confirm that this is far removed from Communism. But it is also far from building socialism. In speaking of this we are not intending to lessen the importance of the President's decrees in the UAR. The people place great hopes in them. Will these hopes be realized? The realization of these decrees depends on whether their fulfilment will be impeded by the reactionary forces which doubtless will attempt to put a spoke in the wheel. In a conversation with me one of the leading journalists of AL-JUMHURIYAH stated openly that opposition from the large bourgeoisie will increase, but 'we have means to suppress it'.

'There was a time', the journalist said, 'when we could not carry out such reforms. We had not the strength, and we were sure neither of our internal nor our international position. Now it is different. We have an army. We cannot wait until the political basis of the regime - parties or unions of parties - has been set up. We are carrying out reforms now, and the main thing is to put them into practice.'

"'Do you not think,' I said, 'that such illusions as "the smoothing away of class differences", and the building of "socialism" with the aid of capitalists might cost the revolution dearly? Surely you have members of the bourgeoisie in your army....'"

"'That is true, but the majority is made up of the masses.'"

"It remained for me to say that the masses formed the majority not only in the army. The working people - the millions of fellahin and labourers - forms a great, deciding force in the United Arab Republic. Only by clearly and unequivocally leaning on this force can the transformation of the country be achieved."

THE PRESS IN IRAQ: A RUSSIAN VISITOR'S COMMENTS

The suppression of Communist and trade union newspapers in Iraq was one of the principal complaints against the Iraqi authorities which were voiced by Soviet and world Communist organizations in their protests to Qasim about anti-Communism in Iraq, in February this year. Although there has since then been no repetition of this campaign, the situation of the Iraqi press and the character of the newspapers now appearing in Iraq are evidently still regarded in the Soviet Union as highly unsatisfactory, to judge from the following article by P. Donskoy which appeared in AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No.7 of 1961.

"Baghdad newsboys are serious and unhurried people. They do not run around the streets, or shower passers-by with cries about 'sensations'. They hang their papers on lines, or spread them out on the pavement and quietly wait for customers. They are not allowed to doze, however; Iraqis are very interested in politics, and greedily buy up the papers, searching through them for news of events at home and abroad. But recently this traditional picture has undergone a marked change. No, the Iraqis themselves are still the same; they still yearn for news, but... they do not want to read many papers. Piles of them lie on the pavements gathering dust until evening when they are returned to the newspaper offices. Why is this? Why has there been such a sharp change in the readers' attitude to the press?

"Let us see what type of publication is being put on the market today by the Baghdad presses. First of all it is noticeable that many papers which Iraqis became accustomed to during the first two years following the

overthrow of the monarchy have disappeared. We have already related how the progressive ITTIHAD ASH-SHA'B was suppressed*. The court acquitted the Basrah workers' paper SAWT AT-TALI'AH, but the local authorities have shut down its press, arrested several employees and created intolerable working conditions so that the paper has ceased to appear. Thus the democratic forces are deprived of all publications. Now the workers' trade unions also are without their press organs. The Kurdish papers are also disappearing one after another.

"In March 1961 a new wave of repression descended on the democratic press. This is how it happened. At the end of the month there was a strike of Baghdad chauffeurs protesting against the increased price of petrol and tobacco and the changes in the taxation system. They were supported by students, teachers and workers from various enterprises. For three days the town was without taxis and buses. Columns of demonstrators came out on to the streets, and they were greeted by rifle and machine-gun fire. The roads of Baghdad became red with the blood of workers. From balconies and roofs stones, bottles and pieces of iron poured down on the heads of the police and soldiers.

"The democratic newspapers which came out in support of the strikers were closed down by order of the Governor-General. Among them were AL-INSANIYAH, which raised its voice in defence of the convicted Mosulis, AL-ISTIQLAL, 14 TAMMUZ, KHABAT the organ of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan and AL-AHALI the organ of the bourgeois National Democratic Party. The AR-RABITAH and FARID presses, where progressive literature was published, were closed down. During the same period the publication of AR-RAY AL-'AMM ceased. Its director, the well-known Iraqi poet and member of the World Peace Congress Muhammad M. Jawahiri was arrested together with a group of journalists 'for incitement to demonstrations'. Later in a Right-wing newspaper it was noted, with some sarcasm, that the poet had been released on bail of 50 fils.

"Thus we see that it is impossible today to buy the democratic press from Baghdad newsboys. What, then, do the latter offer the reader? AL-AHD AL-JADID, AL-FAJR AL-JADID, AL-MUSTAQBAL and ATH-THAWRAH, which specialize in the baiting of patriots and are not above concocting any slander against the Soviet Union; some bourgeois information sheets and periodicals; and AL-BAYAN, the organ of the bourgeois National Progressive Party.

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* See AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA No.3 1961, and MIZAN NEWSLETTER No.3 of 1961, p.3.

"The position of the patriots becomes more complicated as each day passes. The wave of reactionary poison has spread throughout the whole country. Inveterate reactionaries and the dregs of society, such as Malik Sayf, have crawled out from dark corners and gateways. In 1948 he entered the service of the secret police. In the official 'History of Iraq Governments' it states that information supplied by him 'resulted in the arrest of some 200 people' (Communists are meant here - Donskoy's note). 'Malik has been forgiven his former activities and his information has been used for the conviction of arrested persons. The police have not been slow in making use of him.' After the July revolution Malik Sayf had to go to prison. Now this police spy acts the part of a 'theoretician of anti-Communism'. About 50 of his articles have appeared in AL-AHD AL-JADID. The pages of several other newspapers, however, are full of writing of no higher quality.

"In Rashid Street I have some friends among the newsboys. Here they are called 'abu jaridah' (father of the newspaper). One of them - we will call him Ali - is a young and clever lad. He loves reading and philosophizing about what he has read. As I approach he gives me a friendly but dignified smile, and is certain to point out two or three interesting articles so that I shall not miss anything important - for you can't read all the papers.

"Today Ali silently nods his head and averts his eyes."

(Note: The reference to the Baghdad strike of March this year is the first that has appeared in a Soviet publication.)

THE SOVIET VIEW OF DR. MOSADDEQ AND THE NATIONAL FRONT IN PERSIA

The reappearance of supporters of Dr. Mosaddeq and the former National Front on the Persian political scene has been noted in Soviet press reports, in the context of popular opposition to the Persian Government's policy. To judge from such reports one might suppose that the activities of Dr. Mosaddeq and the National Front when they were in power had earned them Soviet support and sympathy. In fact this is far from being the case.

Soviet writers have never expressed unqualified approval of Dr. Mosaddeq's part in the Persian oil nationalization events of 1951-3. According to the Soviet handbook MODERN PERSIA (1957), Mosaddeq's government looked to the oil nationalization law to promote the interests of the Persian landlords and bourgeoisie, and resisted any expansion of the "democratic and worker and peasant movement", which was "the only firm basis of the struggle against imperialism for the nationalization of the

oil industry." Mosaddeq's government is also criticized in this work for using armed force against "democratic demonstrations", and for compelling the (Communist) Tudeh Party and "democratic trade unions" to work underground. On the other hand A.K. Lavrent'yev(1) claims that the successes achieved by Mosaddeq's government would not have been possible without the support of the Tudeh Party, which "led the workers, artisans, peasants and intelligentsia". More recently, in a fairly detailed account of the events of Mosaddeq's premiership(2), Lavrent'yev depicts the latter's "bourgeois" bias as responsible for the failure of the popular "anti-imperialist" movement and for the renewal of Persia's association with the Western countries. A striking feature of Lavrent'yev's narrative is the extent to which he criticizes Mosaddeq's policy from the standpoint of the Tudeh Party.

Lavrent'yev begins his account of the oil nationalization movement by examining the character and composition of the National Front. During the war years, he says, Mosaddeq headed a group of deputies in the Majles who, representing "the middle classes of the national bourgeoisie", came forward in defence of the national interests of the country; they formed the National Front and, because of their active opposition to British imperialism and their support for national aspirations, they enjoyed mass support; they demanded the unconditional restoration to Persia of her oil wealth. The Tudeh Party, "the most massive and most organized force in the country", took up the same position on this issue; and, although after its suppression in 1949 it had to go underground, it took an active part in the struggle against the Supplemental Agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which would have strengthened the British position in Persia.

Lavrent'yev's emphasis on divergences between the Tudeh Party and Mosaddeq begins at the outset of his account of Mosaddeq's premiership. When Mosaddeq announced his oil nationalization programme after taking office on 3rd May 1951, Lavrent'yev says, the "Angle-American imperialists" at once exerted pressure to restrain him from "extreme measures" and induce him to renew negotiations with the AIOC. On 9th May the Tudeh Party Central Committee published in BESUI AYANDEH an open letter to Mosaddeq calling for complete liquidation of the activities of the AIOC, the expulsion of foreign advisers from Persia, the restoration of Persian sovereignty over Bahrain and the nationalization of its oil, and the release of imprisoned patriots in Persia. To this Mosaddeq made no reply.

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(1) KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA XXXVI, pp. 86-96.

(2) IMPERIALISTICHESKAYA POLITIKA SSHA I ANGLII V IRANE, Moscow, 1960.

> "This behaviour was quite characteristic of the conduct of the Persian national bourgeoisie during the period of the general crisis of capitalism. On the one side it aimed at the national independence of its country and strove to make use of the popular movement for this end; on the other it was afraid of the strengthening of the democratic forces, and was frightened of its own people. The facts show that Persia's national bourgeoisie has come out actively against colonialism only when its own interests have been infringed. Accordingly, as a rule, it has not carried through to its conclusion what it has once begun and has contented itself with a certain extension of its position in the country... It sought... to take advantage of the oil nationalization movement in order to distract the people's attention from democratic demands and to direct all its anger against the colonizers... Afraid of the further extension of the popular movement, it was disposed to have recourse to the aid of the imperialists."

An illustration of this, says Lavrent'yev, was a conversation which Mosaddeq had with the US Ambassador Grady; Mosaddeq claimed that the USA should support him in order to prevent the further spread of Communism. Mosaddeq's further activity, Lavrent'yev adds, shows that his constant aim was to create for himself a line of retreat and a base for collusion with imperialist circles. None the less, striving to obtain the maximum advantages for the national bourgeoisie, and not being in a position to ignore the people's demands, his government took decisive steps to put the oil nationalization law into effect.

Lavrent'yev has no further complaint to make of Mosaddeq's attitude until 10th July 1951, when Mosaddeq wrote to President Truman accepting the proposal that Averill Harriman should visit Persia for discussions. The Persian people, says Lavrent'yev, "came out against this American interference in Persia's affairs". On 15th July, the date of Harriman's arrival, the "National Association for Struggle against the Imperialist Oil Companies in Persia" organized in Tehran a demonstration of 100,000 workers, students and others to demand the full implementation of nationalization, Harriman's departure from Persia, the withdrawal of British and American warships from Persian waters, freedom for parties and trade unions, etc. "Reactionary elements and foreign agents armed with knives" made a "provocative attack" on the demonstrators; the police intervened and opened fire, the meeting was broken up, and more than 100 persons were killed and 500 injured. Further repressions followed; the first Festival of Persian Youth and Students was banned, a military emergency was declared, and 80 persons were arrested including Rahim Namvar, the secretary of the "National Association".

This seems to have been, in Lavrent'yev's view, the turning-point in relations between the Mosaddeq government and the popular forces. The

rest of his account of the Mosaddeq regime is a narrative of popular protests and demonstrations demanding "democratic liberties" and the liquidation of "imperialist influence" in Persia, and of government action to resist the first of those demands and to respond only partially to popular pressure on the second. He mentions in particular the popular demonstration of 30th September 1951 in Tehran, which "obliged" the government to expel British specialists from Abadan; the Majles elections of January 1952, which "showed how great was the force of the Persian people's opposition to the anti-popular and anti-national policy"; the second congress of the "National Association for Struggle against Imperialism" in February 1952, which demanded that the Government should cease blindly following the camp of war and imperialism and should unite with the democratic countries"; the same organization's meeting of 20th March 1952 on the anniversary of the oil nationalization law, and the government's subsequent measures against the popular movement, including the "virtual imposition of martial law", the closing of branches of the Federation of Democratic Youth, the arrest of "suspected persons", etc; and the demonstration on the anniversary of the July shootings of 1951, which was followed by the Shah's intervention, backed by the Americans, and the replacement of Mosaddeq by "the agent of the American monopolies" Qavam as-Saltaneh. Qavam as-Saltaneh's overthrow is in turn represented as the result of a vast popular movement of strikes, protests and demonstrations. Mosaddeq's subsequent action in breaking off relations with Britain is applauded, but Lavrent'yev points out that Persian "patriots" demanded also that relations with the USA should be broken off; he quotes a letter to Mosaddeq from the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party, published in NAGHMEYE NAU of 15th October 1952, demanding the expulsion of American "spies", the rejection of all American influence and the offer of Persian oil to "the free democratic countries".

The final failure of the "anti-imperialist movement of the Persian people" Lavrent'yev ascribes to the shortcomings of Mosaddeq and his colleagues in the National Front. Mosaddeq, he repeats, represented those classes of the bourgeoisie who saw the need to end British domination and to resist American influence; "but Mosaddeq feared his own people, and had recourse to police measures in order to suppress the masses, who had risen in struggle for the complete liberation of their country". This fear accounted for the refusal of the National Front to cooperate with the Tudeh Party, "which repeatedly proposed to Mosaddeq to take joint action against the colonizers". Differences between the leaders of the National Front were exploited by "the British and American imperialists"; in particular, the religious leader Kashani and others, who were extreme reactionaries, were favourably disposed towards the Americans while being violently anti-British. After the abortive coup d'etat of 15th August 1953, when the Shah fled to Baghdad, the Mosaddeq government adopted a "passive" attitude and did not strive for the complete suppression of the conspiracy; the Tudeh Party in an appeal to the Persian people called for a united front of all parties and demanded that, now that the Shah,

"the first agent of imperialism", had fled, all other "nests of conspirators" should be destroyed. The Mosaddeq government, however, once again "displayed irresolution", which allowed the Shah's supporters and Gen. Zahedi to seize power.

Lavrent'yev sums up his account of this episode with a quotation from Lenin: "It very often happens - indeed, it happens in the majority of cases - that the bourgeoisie of oppressed countries, although it supports national movements, at the same time finds common cause with the imperialist bourgeoisie and together with it fights against all revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes." Lavrent'yev evidently considers that the issue in Persia in 1951-3 was not merely the nationalization of Persian oil but something far more radical - the realignment of Persia's foreign policy towards the "democratic countries", and the "democratic" transformation of her internal regime.

The Soviet Union's own attempt to secure an oil concession in Persia is only very briefly mentioned by Lavrent'yev. He says that Soviet proposals for such a concession in 1944 "met with the approval of the Persian progressive public", but the Persian Government, under British and American influence, insisted on postponing any decision on this until the end of the war. In order to show British and American policy in the worst possible light Lavrent'yev omits all reference to Soviet plans for the subversion of Persia during the crucial years of 1946 and 1947. As every Persian knows, the outstanding events of those years were the failure of the Azerbayjan separatist movement initiated by the Soviet Government, and the Persian Parliament's rejection in October 1947 of the Qavam-Sadchikov oil agreement signed in Moscow in April 1946. Of the negotiation of this ill-fated agreement Lavrent'yev makes no mention whatever when describing Qavam's visit to Moscow from 19th February to 11th March 1956.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on Middle East affairs appearing in Soviet newspapers during the period 29th July - 9th September.

UAR The UAR decrees on nationalization and land distribution were the subject of a brief PRAVDA report (15.8.61). For a Soviet comment on the new measures, published in IZVESTIYA, see the first article in this issue.

In a report on UAR reaction to the Soviet resumption of nuclear tests, PRAVDA (1.9.61) claimed that "the Arab public correctly understands the USSR's latest measures, regarding them as something which was forced upon

the Soviet Union". The Cairo newspaper AL-MASA, said PRAVDA, had expressed the view that the Soviet measures were a reply to recent increasing threats by the West to use force to impose its will on the world. The Arabs were well aware of the threat represented by such statements as that of Chester Bowles, who when in Lagos recently had declared that the USA would be justified in conducting atomic tests in the Sahara.

A Soviet-UAR contract signed in Cairo on 2nd August provides for work by Soviet organizations on the first stage of the Aswan High Dam to the value of over 11 million rubles, and the employment of 570 Soviet specialists in the first stage of construction (PRAVDA 4.8.61). The foundation stone has been laid of a nitric fertilizers factory which is to be built near Homs under the Soviet economic and technical agreement with the Syrian region of the UAR (KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA 3.8.61). On 27th July the first atomic reactor to be built in Africa, at Nishas near Cairo, was put into trial operation. The reactor was planned and constructed in the Soviet Union (TRUD 29.7.61).

The Syrian and Iraqi Communist Parties PRAVDA (25.8.61) published in full two messages, one from the Central Committee of the Syrian Communist Party and the other from the Iraqi Communist Party Secretary Salam Adil, congratulating the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on Major Gagarin's space flight and on the publication of the new Soviet Communist Party programme.

Israel The Soviet press has given practically no attention to the Israeli elections. An exception was an article in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (27.7.61) which represented the launching of the Israeli rocket as intended to "raise the spirits of the Israeli population, which is disillusioned with the policy of the Ben Gurion government", and thereby to win votes for the Mapai Party in the coming elections. In fact, said the writer, the government's policy of militarization and increasing taxation was causing growing discontent among the population.

The Soviet press continued to represent the Eichmann trial as an unavowed indictment of Eichmann's "West German accomplices". IZVESTIYA (3.9.61) published an article by Gerhard Leo, special correspondent of the East German news agency covering the trial, who declared that the trial, "contrary to the wishes of its organizers and despite all the efforts of Bonn", had incriminated "the present state of German militarism, the Federal German Republic, which follows in the path of the Hitlerite criminals".

The "CENTO secret documents" On 18th August Tass made public some alleged secret documents of the former Baghdad Pact Organization, "out of those which the Soviet Union has at its disposal". The documents were made

available to the Soviet and foreign press, and photographs of them with Russian translation were published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (19.8.61). The documents were (a) a "Nuclear Target Study" issued by the Baghdad Pact Military Committee, dated 3rd February 1958, which referred to "certain alterations and additions to the list of targets in Soviet territory", and also listed "tactical interdiction" targets "in our own territory" as "part of the fire plan for the defensive battle". Most of these targets were in Persian territory, and a number also were in Afghanistan and some in West Pakistan. According to its distribution list, the "Nuclear Target Study" was to be sent to the Chiefs of Staff of Persia, Iraq, Pakistan and Turkey (Persia appearing first on the list). It was also to be forwarded to the US and UK authorities for study with a view to "approving the suitability of the targets for nuclear attack". With it was published (b) part of a comment on the "Nuclear Target Study" by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, dated 3rd June 1958.

(Note: According to a high official of the CENTO organization, "such documents have never existed, nor has CENTO had such a plan" - see THE TIMES of 21.8.61.)

In the subsequent Soviet propaganda campaign against CENTO for which they have provided the material, the alleged Baghdad Pact documents have been throughout referred to as "CENTO documents" and their 1958 date is conveniently overlooked.

The first Soviet pronouncement on the subject was a long Tass statement of 18th August (PRAVDA 19.8.61). This stated that "the CENTO atom-maniacs" wanted "to stab the Soviet Union in the back from bases in Turkey, Persia and Pakistan, and immediately after that to reduce to ashes towns and populated centres in many regions of Persia and Pakistan, deliberately turning these territories into a death zone". The rulers of CENTO member states had not shrunk from "dooming the population of their countries to extermination and cruel death". Nuclear blows at "a number of peace-loving states" were envisaged. What now was the value of the Shah of Persia's assurances that CENTO was "a defensive organisation" and that as long as he lived no danger to the Soviet Union would come from the territory of Persia? "The Soviet people would like to hope that the peoples of Persia, Turkey and Pakistan and those leaders in these countries who realize the dangerous nature of all these adventures will display vigilance and not allow their countries to be involved in these adventures." There has been much subsequent Soviet comment arguing that, if the CENTO policy-makers can treat their member countries and neighbouring neutral states in this manner, the same is to be expected from other Western military blocs elsewhere.

Persia As might be expected, Soviet newspapers gave new emphasis to the theme of Persian popular demand for neutrality and withdrawal from CENTO, in the light of the "CENTO secret documents". KRASNAYA ZVEZDA (24.8.61)

said that the Persian people were calling the policy of Western military alliances hostile to the Soviet Union "a policy of suicide". The "mortal danger" of participation in CENTO had been made even clearer to them by the CENTO documents.

IZVESTIYA (6.9.61) quoted at length from an article in the Beirut newspaper ASH-SHA'B on the visit of Mr. Talbot, the US Assistant of the Secretary of State, to Tehran on a special mission for President Kennedy. The latter, said ASH-SHA'B, was "keenly interested in the situation in Persia, especially after the publication in Moscow of the CENTO secret documents". ASH-SHA'B went on to speak of "panic and even uprisings" in the northern areas which were to be turned into a "death zone" according to the CENTO plans.

Tass dispatches from Tehran reported (IZVESTIYA 29.8.61) a strike by sugar factory workers in Birjand demanding proper labour protection measures, (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 3.8.61) clashes between gendarmes and peasants demanding fairer treatment by landlords, and (IZVESTIYA 7.9.61) protests by trade unionists against high rents.

Turkey Tass dispatches from Istanbul, published in BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY, reported (28.7.61) strikes by workers in a parquet factory in Erlek and by workers in an artificial silk factory in Gemlik demanding higher pay, and (19.8.61) the trial in Bursa of 10 textile factory workers accused of Communist propaganda.

Cyprus A Cypriot parliamentary delegation headed by G. Clerides, Speaker of the Cypriot Parliament, visited the Soviet Union from 25th July to 12th August. The delegation visited Moscow, Stalingrad, Kiev, Tbilisi, Tashkent and Leningrad, and were received by Brezhnev in the Kremlin on 11th August. PRAVDA (13.8.61) published a message of greetings and thanks to the Soviet people from Clerides.

The first anniversary of Cypriot independence was the subject of an article in PRAVDA. PRAVDA said that the consequences of "the artificial dependence of the Cypriot economy on British monopolies" were still to be seen today; that none of the US assistance promised under the US-Cypriot economic agreement had so far materialized, but talks had been held about the construction of a "Voice of America" radio station in the island; and that US statements made it clear that Cyprus was regarded by the USA as a promising psychological warfare centre in the struggle against Communism in the Middle East. PRAVDA concluded by referring with satisfaction to the development of Soviet-Cypriot friendship, trade and cultural relations during the past year.

A F R I C A

SOVIET VIEWS ON EURAFRICA

The attitude of Soviet writers to any association between the capitalist states and the underdeveloped countries is of course invariably hostile and conditioned by their inability to admit that the "capitalist monopolies" can act from other than purely selfish motives. The idea that such an association could be profitable to both parties is not considered, and any benefits the under-developed countries might receive from it are represented in Soviet writing as unplanned and unavoidable side-effects. Eurafrica is no exception to this rule. Thus the SMALL SOVIET ENCYCLOPAEDIA published in 1959 defines Eurafrica as follows: "Imperialist plans for uniting the countries of Europe and Africa in a single economic entity for the extensive joint exploitation of the natural riches and manpower of Africa by West European monopolies... The task of Eurafrica is the economic strengthening of European capitalism, the broadening of its military and strategic base and the perpetuation of the dependence of the African peoples on the colonial powers." L.G. Gukasyan-Gandzaketsi (THE NATURE OF THE "EURAFRICAN ASSOCIATION", Moscow, 1959) states even more bluntly that "essentially the plan for establishing Eurafrica is an attempt by the imperialist monopolies of Western Europe to solve their main economic and political problems at the expense of a further intensification of the exploitation of African colonial possessions". In so far as the idea of Eurafrica has been realized in the association of certain African countries with the Common Market, Soviet writers point out that the original agreement was reached without consultation with the African countries concerned, and they allege that it is mainly a vehicle for resurgent West German imperialism.

Eurafrica and the post-war scene G.Ye. Skorov, in a booklet entitled WHO WANTS EURAFRICA, Moscow, 1957, maintains that the idea of Eurafrica, which was put forward before the war, has always been ardently supported by Germany which felt cheated of its fair share of Africa and that, although European Social Democrats and in particular the French Socialists have been its most fervent advocates since the war, all those who support Eurafrica "objectively further the realization of the revenge-seeking schemes of resurgent West German imperialism". Skorov says that there are at least four reasons why Eurafrica became topical after the Second World War.

Firstly, European capitalism had declined and the West European monopolies hoped to rejuvenate it by increased exploitation of Africa. Secondly, the awakening of Africa and in particular the 1952 revolution in Egypt, the Suez crisis and Algeria showed that singly the colonial powers could no longer suppress the liberation movement; by yielding part of their colonial interests the colonial powers hoped to maintain the whole by making all capitalist Europe jointly responsible for the suppression of the liberation movement. Thirdly, the West European bourgeoisie wished to lessen its dependence on the USA by acquiring raw materials in Africa previously paid for in dollars and to become a third force between the USA and the USSR. Fourthly, the imperialists wanted to use Africa as a military base "in the new war planned by NATO strategists". Thus, Skorov concludes, Eurafrica offers nothing to the peoples of Africa and its aims are "reactionary" and "contrary to the natural course of world events". Such plans for the joint exploitation of under-developed countries he says, have always been shortlived and full of contradictions. Eurafrica is a "sum of contradictions", between the imperialist powers of Europe and the peoples of Africa, between different groupings of European monopoly capital, and between capitalist Europe as a whole and the USA. Later Skorov states that it is due to these imperialist contradictions that virtually only France agreed to associate her African colonies with the Common Market, a "pitiful likeness of Eurafrica".

France and Eurafrica All Soviet writers agree that France was led to ask for the overseas territories to be associated with the Common Market in an effort to salvage what remained of her disintegrating colonial empire. According to Skorov the loss of Indo-China, Tunisia and Morocco forced French capitalists to revise their views on keeping French overseas territories as their private preserve. A bilateral agreement with the USA in Indo-China had only led to the country passing under US control, so France decided to save her colonial heritage on a multilateral basis and thus neutralize the political influence of individual states and keep control for herself. French supporters of the idea of association, says Skorov, argued that their non-inclusion would have graver consequences for France and therefore, putting on a brave face, France agreed to open the doors of her overseas markets to the Six on two conditions: firstly, tariff protection for goods from the overseas territories and, secondly, that the rest of the Six would contribute to investment under French control in the infra-structure of the overseas territories. The first condition was to guarantee a market for the colonies' production and the second to save the French Government money, which could then be spent on encouraging exports and re-equipping French industry. According to L.L. Kruglov ("Penetration of Africa by West German Monopolies", KRATKIYE SOOBSHCHENIYA INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA XLI, Moscow, 1959), France allowed West Germany into her colonies because she needed capital to develop them and hoped by increased exploitation both to improve her position in the Common Market and to bolster up her position in the colonies. She also hoped that

association with West Germany would enable her to keep the latter's activities within limits advantageous to France. Ya. Etinger (BONN GRABS FOR AFRICA, Moscow, 1960) says that France also wanted "the political, military and financial support of Bonn for the continuation of the colonial war in Algeria" and certain circles in France hoped that West Germany would be forced to show direct political support for the French colonial system and thus undermine her "anti-colonial prestige" among the African national bourgeoisie. Further France tried to limit West German activity in her overseas territories by insisting that a majority of shares in every company should be French, but none the less she was forced to make concessions. A. Goncharov (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No. 6 of 1961) reiterates many of the arguments above when he says that France, finding herself no longer able to save her colonial empire alone or halt the expansion of her American "allies", decided to resort to "collective European colonialism" under the Common Market. France hoped for funds to finance her colonial enterprises and to "increase the bribes to certain sections of the comprador bourgeoisie", and also for the military aid of her Common Market partners in crushing the national liberation movement.

West Germany and Eurafrica Skorov claims that although West Germany was outwardly cool towards the idea of the inclusion of the overseas territories, "in reality she greeted the news with exultation"; her age-old dream of getting hold of the wealth of French Africa was near to realization. Skorov says that the West Germans were not at all keen on the infra-structure investments but were prepared to make the sacrifice in order to gain access. Like other Soviet writers, Gukasyan-Gandzaketsi considers that the association of the overseas territories leads to "a new crop of acute Franco-German inter-imperialist contradictions". West German monopolies, he says, are doing all they can to supplant French capital in Africa and have forced the French to make concessions. "Sooner or later", he declares, "the creation of the 'Common Eurafrican Market' will lead to the subordination of the whole zone of this market, including its African sector, to the economic hegemony of the German trusts." Etinger describes the association of the overseas territories with the Common Market as "essentially an original form of the reallotment of colonies in Africa in favour of the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with the changed correlation of imperialist forces in West Europe". According to Etinger, "certain circles in Bonn hoped that participation in Eurafrica would save the Federal Republic from the charge of colonialism" but West German participation in Eurafrica plans "was taken in Africa as support by Bonn for the 'collective colonialism' against which the African peoples are waging a brave fight", and West German support for the French in Algeria has completely exploded the myth of their 'anti-colonialism'. Goncharov claims that contradictions are increasing among the Common Market partners who have never liked attempts by the French to control investments in and trade with the associated territories. He says that the West Germans never wanted to spend capital on propping up the

French colonial empire when all they were waiting for was its final breakdown. In contrast to Etinger and others who try to show that Eurafrica has led to a major invasion of the associated territories by West German monopolies, Goncharov states that, in order to make France give up her claims to priority in colonial plunder, West Germany boycotted the proposals on private capital investments, withholding them from the French colonies. He goes on to say that the relatively small influx of German capital was also due in large measure to the unstable political situation, but as soon as the territories became independent they were "literally swamped" by West German industrialists and government representatives.

Aims of the USA and other Western countries Soviet writers take the view that the USA supports Eurafrica because it answers general US political and military aims in the fight against Communism and offers the USA a chance of penetrating Africa through its German investments. S.Ye. Fil'shtinskiy (PROBLEMY VOSTOKOVEDENIYA No. 2 of 1960) claims in fact that it was Americans who put forward the idea of Eurafrica soon after the war, "firstly to link the aggressive bloc in West Europe with the African hinterland in the political, economic and military respects and secondly, using these links, to penetrate into the African colonies of European states and turn the whole of Africa into an American supercolony". This scheme fell through, he says, because of British resistance to American penetration of British colonies, and even more because of the liberation movement, particularly in North Africa. Skorov, writing in 1957, stated that, although Eurafrica expressed Western Europe's desire to be a third force between the USA and the USSR, it was not an anti-American idea in present circumstances. The USA was interested in any action likely to strengthen the capitalist world against the socialist countries and the national liberation movement. But, on the other hand, the USA did not want rivalry in exploiting other countries. This explained the contradictions in the US attitude. At present the former consideration took precedence, and America felt that her military bases and capital were safe as long as Europe remained in Africa. Moreover American monopolies were closely linked with West German monoply capital and were therefore interested in West German expansion. At the same time they carried on their own penetration of Africa and jealously guarded the positions they had already gained. An instance of this was Belgium's withdrawal of the Congo from the Common Market agreement. The real reason for this was not that it was not going to get a big enough share of the investment fund, but pressure from the USA, which feared a weakening of its strong positions in the Congo. According to Y. Rubinskiy (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS No. 7 of 1957) "the United States regarded the Eurafrica projects very favourably"; it hoped not only to penetrate the French Union through the Ruhr concerns but also "to inveigle Africa into the military system of NATO and the Baghdad pact". Gukasyan-Gandzaketsi stated that the Americans regarded the Common Eurafrican Market as the economic foundation of NATO and as a chance for economic penetration of Africa. They

would be able to increase the sale of goods manufactured by West European concerns in which they had a financial interest, and would use their profits in the Common Market countries for investment in French Africa and thus strive to get control over the sources of strategic and scarce raw materials in Africa.

As regards the other members of the Six, Soviet commentators do little more than note that they each look at the association of the overseas territories with the Common Market from their own selfish viewpoint. Thus Skorov says that Italy, because of lack of capital for her own development, was against the investment fund but hoped for compensations through increased exports, a strengthening of its positions in its former African colonies and the chance of relieving chronic unemployment by dumping its surplus manpower in Africa. Rubinskiy comments that Belgium was not enthusiastic about the inclusion of the overseas territories, because there was no lack of private investment in her colonies and at the time virtually no liberation movement. Moreover she did not like the system of preferential tariffs and preferred to keep to her "open door" policy which brought in dollars; that was why the Congo was not included. Britain's attitude to the Common Market is discussed by Skorov and Gukasyan-Gandzaketsi. Skorov notes that Britain was not prepared to sacrifice her Commonwealth preferences, while Gukasyan-Gandzaketsi describes Britain's efforts to get over her difficulties through the Free Trade Area.

Failure of Eurafrica plans It will be obvious from the above that the picture presented by Soviet writers is aimed at giving the impression that Eurafrica was thought up solely to satisfy the various desires of the West European monopolies. They allege that the needs and wishes of the various African countries were not consulted in any degree and that talk of "aid" and "a new era in relations between the metropolitan countries and the colonies" are "pure demagogy". According to Skorov, there was no reason to take the promises of industrialization and a higher standard of living seriously. Industrialization would be limited and production would go on military aircraft and explosives. Moreover factories would be modern, demanding the minimum personnel. They would contribute nothing to African development. Furthermore, the flooding of African markets with cheap European goods would strangle young national industries, particularly in the newly independent territories. As for the investment fund there was no reason to think it would promote development, seeing that France's programme of "economic and social development" had done nothing to decrease poverty. The free movement of labour would also have one-sided results, with an influx of skilled European workers into Africa depressing the labour market. The hopes of some members of the African national bourgeoisie that Eurafrica would further their well-being were ill-founded; and the best they could hope for was to be treated as a "poor relation". Eurafrica was a serious threat to all African countries, both dependent and independent. "Interdependence would inevitably mean the subordination

of the weak (underdeveloped Africa) to the strong (industrialized Europe)"; it was a cover for modernized colonialism, and perpetuated the oppressed condition of the Africans. "Interdependence" in the framework of Eurafrica had the aim of "seriously complicating the task of liberation... from colonialism and of returning... to colonial slavery those countries which have already won political independence". That was why African countries and "progressive forces" were against it.

Goncharov asserts that the three years or more than have passed since the Common Market treaty came into effect have shown the failure of the "Eurafrican idea of the French colonialists". Firstly, Morocco and Tunisia did not join, as the French hoped, and Guinea and Mali opted out on attaining independence. Secondly, the economic position of the overseas territories grew "noticeably worse"; the influx of West German, Italian, Belgian and Dutch manufactured goods "greatly curtailed possibilities for the development of national industries", and "the odious one-crop system of agriculture and the exclusive development of the extracting industries became even more pronounced". Thirdly, the "aid" appeared only in plans drawn up mainly for propaganda purposes; actual investments were only one fourth of the sum stipulated, "merely crumbs of the huge wealth appropriated by the colonialists in the Dark Continent". Moreover France insisted on deciding how investments should be distributed. The African countries were dissatisfied with this arrangement, and had realized also that "the tying up of exports from African countries to the Common Market merely increases the dangerous dependence of their economy on the slightest fluctuation of West European business activity". The "colonialists" had been forced to make some concessions to the African countries, and in October 1960 they agreed that the latter should have their own representatives in Common Market agencies. "It goes without saying that these concessions are not of a fundamental nature, but they undoubtedly show that the European colonialists must increasingly reckon with public demands in the African countries".

Recent developments Goncharov examines "the theoretical basis of the 'new' doctrine of West European imperialism with regard to the 'associated' African countries" as drawn up at the conference of experts of the Six in Paris last autumn. Its gist, he says, was as follows: Firstly, investments must be guaranteed against political risks. This is so that the monopolists can "rob" the Africans "with impunity", and "in case of any 'unexpected' changes they would have a 'lawful' pretext for unleashing an imperialist aggression". Secondly, "aid" is to be differentiated for each country; this means that "recalcitrant" states can be punished and "loyal" ones rewarded. Thirdly, bilateral and multilateral "aid" are to be combined. Fourthly, aid programmes should be drawn up with the active participation of the countries concerned. But this, says Goncharov, "is fully nullified by the content of the first two points of the doctrine". He goes on to discuss the conference between the EEC partners and African

members of parliament in Rome in January 1961. At this conference the leaders of Eurafrica "with the help of African leaders loyal to the West European monopolies,... succeeded in selling the 'idea' of a Common African Market" to the Africans, and an African-Malagasy Union was formed in March. Although, says Goncharov, cooperation among African countries "is undoubtedly progressive in principle", this is not true of the African-Malagasy Union. It is not based on a "just striving for mutual assistance and cooperation among African states, but has been created by the European colonialists as an appendage to that aggressive imperialist grouping, the European Economic Community". He ends by saying that the African-Malagasy Union will not lead to substantial changes in the relations between the monopolies of Little Europe and the African countries, and the "colonialists" hope to use the Common African Market to reintroduce "the rusty shackles of colonialism".

The recent conference of E.E.C. and African parliamentarians in Strasbourg was briefly reported by Tass (PRAVDA VOSTOKA 21.6.61 and 27.6.61) under the headings "Plans for Enslaving the African Countries" and "Colonialism under a New Signboard". Yves Moreau (?) contributed a long article to IZVESTIYA (25.7.61) on the conference. The imperialists, he said, talked a lot of their philanthropic aims, but the "aid" was far from being free of strings; the political aims of the association were to "separate the young African states from other anti-imperialist forces existing in the world, in order to prevent their carrying out a national democratic policy and to include them in the system of anti-Communist blocs".

It is noticeable that in all these accounts Soviet writers refrain from attacking the leaders of the African states for wishing to be associated with the Common Market. They are presumably anxious not to prejudice the leaders of the newly independent states against the USSR while there is still hope that they might be won over to the "anti-imperialist" camp.

The venom of these Soviet attacks on plans for Afro-European economic association, which are often virulent to the point of incoherence, is a measure of the apprehension with which such plans are viewed in the USSR and of Soviet disgust at the very real benefits which the African countries will derive from them. Above all, perhaps, it is a measure of Soviet resentment at incontrovertible economic facts which link Africa with the Western countries.

AFRICA IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on African affairs appearing in the Soviet press during the period 16th July - 15th September 1961.

Congo

The convocation of the Congolese Parliament in Lovanium was welcomed in the Soviet press. In PRAVDA (18.7.61) V. Mayevskiy said it represented "a success for the national forces led by Antoine Gizenga" who had continued Lumumba's policy of genuine independence and national unity and had insisted on the calling of parliament as the only means of restoring law and order. The enemies of the Congolese people had tried to isolate Gizenga's government by economic blockade, military intimidation and slanders, but the insistence of the Congolese masses had forced the colonialists and their puppets to agree to the calling of parliament. For ensuring that the deputies could work in normal conditions without threats and pressure great responsibility lay on the United Nations. "The UN military authorities have in the past done not a little to aggravate the tragedy of the Congo. It may be that, finally, they will do something effectively to help the Congolese people."

IZVESTIYA (19 and 20.7.61) published long dispatches from Stanleyville on the hopes and enthusiasm aroused among Gizenga's supporters by the convocation of parliament. N. Khokhlov (20.7.61) represented Mr. Hammarskjoeld as hostile to the calling of parliament and to Congolese unity; he alleged that Mr. Hammarskjoeld was more anxious to bring about a meeting of Congolese political leaders, an idea which had been taken up by Mr. Tshombe.

A Tass statement issued on 25th July (PRAVDA 26.7.61) said that "the colonialists and their henchman Hammarskjoeld" were engaged in "suspicious machinations" in connection with the convocation of the Congolese Parliament. The scheduled date for the opening of the parliament had long since passed, and parliament had not yet started its activities. Various press reports showed that the colonialists and their puppets among local representatives, fearing that parliament might confirm the powers of the central government headed by Gizenga, were resorting to subversive activity to prevent this. "Alarming reports are appearing that, to attain their ends, they are ready to exterminate recalcitrant patriots devoted to their people, as they did when they brutally assassinated Patrice Lumumba and a group of his comrades-in-arms." The Belgian colonialists and Belgium's NATO allies, "still relying on their lackey Hammarskjoeld and his representatives in the Congo, who continue to discredit the UN flag", were responsible for the delay in the resumption of the parliament's work.

A Tass dispatch from Paris (PRAVDA 27.7.61) reported briefly that supporters of Lumumba had been elected to the majority of leading posts in parliament. However, other reports continued to speak of violations of the agreement on the parliament's activity, alleging that the UN authorities were shutting their eyes to this.

There was no immediate comment on the confirmation of Cyrille Adoula as Premier. PRAVDA (4.8.61) noted that he had declared that his government would work to restore law and order in the Congo and to unite the Congolese army, and would pursue a policy of positive neutrality. Later (9.8.61) PRAVDA quoted the Stanleyville newspaper UHURU for the view that the new government was the "direct successor of the lawful government of Patrice Lumumba, which until now was headed by Antoine Gizenga". In this way it had left in force the decisions taken by Gizenga's government and had revoked the decisions of the Ileo "government". A Tass dispatch from Stanleyville (20.8.61) reported that Gizenga had received the heads of diplomatic missions there and presented them to Adoula; he thanked them for their moral support, and explained that Adoula's government was the direct successor of that of Lumumba. Khrushchev sent a message of good wishes to Adoula on his appointment and declared that the Soviet Government would continue to maintain diplomatic relations with the Congo Republic and strive to develop friendly relations with it (PRAVDA 1.9.61).

PRAVDA (29.8.61) reported very briefly, without comment, the UN action in rounding up foreign officers serving in Tshombe's army. After that no reports on Congo events appeared in the Soviet press until the Katanga conflict broke out on 13th September.

On 14th September PRAVDA reported briefly, without any prominence, that UN forces had assumed control over Katanga after bloody fighting with the Katangese forces in Elizabethville. The next day PRAVDA published a long article by T. Kolesnichenko. This, however, contained little relevant comment on the Katanga situation. Its main contention was that the UN operation was something that was long overdue, and had only been undertaken in an attempt to save the prestige of the UN representatives, and in particular of Hammarskjoeld, in view of the approaching General Assembly session: "even the UN representatives, in order not to lose the last shred of their prestige, could no longer openly support the band of criminals in Katanga". But, Kolesnichenko declared, the struggle for the freedom of the Congo was not yet over, and the colonialists were "manoeuvring".

President Nkrumah's Visit to the USSR

President Nkrumah's visit to the USSR was given considerable publicity in the Soviet press. Speeches made at receptions, etc. were reported verbatim in PRAVDA and the whole tour was reported in much detail. The

following short account is only intended to show the comprehensive character of the tour arranged for the Ghanaian visitors and to bring out some of the main points of the speeches.

Dr. Nkrumah was greeted by Brezhnev on his arrival at Vnukovo airport on 10th July. On the same day he attended a Kremlin reception for participants in the Soviet Aviation Day display, at which Khrushchev and Brezhnev were present. On 11th July he laid a wreath at the Lenin and Stalin Mausoleum. A luncheon was given for him in the Kremlin. Also on 11th July he visited the Moscow State University where he was met by Africans studying at the university and at the Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship University. He spent two hours at the university and an honorary degree of Doctor of Law was conferred on him. In the evening he attended a concert at the Soviet Army Theatre. On 12th July Dr. Nkrumah toured the Kremlin in the morning, visited the No.1 ball-bearing works in the afternoon, and went to the Moscow circus in the evening.

On 13th July Dr. Nkrumah visited the Soviet Economic Exhibition, and the Academy of Sciences. The Academy's President, Keldysh, told him about the structure of the Academy and about the most important scientific problems on which Soviet scientists are now working, such as machineless generation of energy, new materials and thermonuclear energy. Dr. Nkrumah said: "Your experience and your knowledge, which you share in such a friendly way with us, will be highly useful to my fellow countrymen because we plan to set up an Academy of Sciences soon." Keldysh said that, at the request of Ghanaian scientists, Soviet specialists were completing a magnetic measurement station for Ghana. Prof. Potekhin, Director of the Africa Institute, gave Dr. Nkrumah an account of the latest work of his institute, a monograph on neo-colonialism.

On 14th July Dr. Nkrumah left for Irkutsk, accompanied by Sh.M. Arushanyan, Deputy Chairman of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet, and Ya.A. Malik, Deputy Foreign Minister. On 15th July they left for Bratsk to inspect the hydro-electric power scheme. On returning to Irkutsk Dr. Nkrumah was taken for a trip on Lake Baykal. On 16th July he visited the Irkutsk hydro-electric power station in the morning, and then left for Tashkent. In the evening he visited the "Kzyl Uzbekistan" collective farm, and on the following morning the farm's cotton plantations and the Tashkent textile works, after which he went sightseeing in Tashkent. Later in the day he visited the Tuya-Buguz reservoir which is under construction, and in the evening the Uzbek Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers gave a dinner in his honour.

On 18th July Dr. Nkrumah left for Kiev, where he visited industrial undertakings and was entertained by the Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. On 20th July he left for Leningrad, where he went sightseeing and visited Lenin's former headquarters in Smolnyy. On the evening of 21st July, after a day spent in visiting the

"Elektrosila" works and further sightseeing, he left for Moscow. On 22nd July he met Brezhnev and Mikoyan in the Kremlin. Later in the day he gave a reception for Soviet leaders. On 23rd July he visited the air force station at Kubinka near Noscow and saw an aerobatic display. Later the same day the Ghanaian delegation inspected the Kurchatov atomic energy institute. The Ghanaian Minister of Defence Charles de Graft-Dickson called on Marshal Grechko, the Soviet Deputy Defence Minister. On 24th July Soviet-Ghanaian talks were held in the Kremlin; the USSR was represented by Mikoyan and the State Planning Commission Chairman Novikov. On the same day a Soviet-Ghanaian friendship meeting was held, at which long speeches were made by Brezhnev and Dr. Nkrumah. Later a government reception was given in the Kremlin. Dr. Nkrumah left Moscow on 25th July.

On his arrival in Moscow on 10th July Dr. Nkrumah said he looked forward to seeing "the great achievements of the Soviet people which we have heard so much about, the glorious results of the Communist Revolution and reconstruction". He hoped that his visit would "substantially reinforce our determination to crush imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism in Africa, and help further the difficult but victorious advance of the African peoples towards their destiny, namely complete political and economic emancipation and African unity - that is, the political and economic unification of the African continent" (PRAVDA 11.7.61). These two themes, of admiration for Soviet Communist achievement and Soviet-Ghanaian solidarity in the cause of African liberation and unity, were to be repeated throughout the visit.

Khrushchev, in his speech at the Kremlin luncheon on 11th July, expressed his appreciation of what Dr. Nkrumah had said on the previous day about the benefits brought by the Communist Revolution in Russia. In the course of his reply Dr. Nkrumah praised the way in which the political and economic ideals of Lenin and of the October Revolution had been transformed into reality; "I am convinced that the new ideas which your country champions will in this new era conquer the forces of reaction." On the solidarity of Ghana and the Soviet Union Dr. Nkrumah said:

> "One could say that the future of our two countries is interrelated. Both our countries passionately believe in universal peace, in security, in peaceful coexistence.... We are invariably lined up against colonialism and imperialism, in all their forms and manifestations, in any place in the world." (PRAVDA 12.7.61)

African liberation and unity, and the example of the Soviet Union, were also the themes of Dr. Nkrumah's speech at the friendship meeting on 24th July:

> "The example of the Soviet Union shows that the ideal of African unity is not an empty political dream; it is capable

> of realization, and we are determined to realize it at all costs... The people of the Soviet Union, by so successfully welding many republics and nationalities together into one big country, have demonstrated the effectiveness of political union. And to me this is an achievement which we can and must emulate in Africa, where the conditions for unity are so favourable, and the necessity for it so pressing." (PRAVDA 25.7.61)

The main subjects of the joint Soviet-Ghanaian communique issued on 24th July (PRAVDA 25.7.61) were the following: struggle for peace - Ghana supported the Soviet disarmament proposals, and the USSR supported the Ghana proposal for making Africa a zone free from foreign military bases and nuclear weapons; colonialism - both governments would work for implementation without delay of the UN declaration; Congo, Angola, South Africa, Tunisia and Algeria - full agreement on these African issues; Africa and the Common Market - the "plan to tie the African countries to European imperialism" must be resisted as hindering the development of free international trade exchanges; the Belgrade conference of neutral states - Ghana has informed the USSR of its intention to participate, and the latter hopes that the conference will make its contribution to peace, disarmament and the elimination of colonialism; the structure of the UN - this must be reorganized to ensure equitable representation for the neutral states, the socialist states and the Western powers and their allies; China must be admitted to the UN; Germany - the Ghana Government "has shown an understanding of" the Soviet proposal for a German peace treaty and the settlement of the West Berlin question on this basis; Soviet-Ghanaian relations - Ghana wished for a further expansion of trade and economic and technical cooperation, and the USSR was examining this; cultural relations were satisfactory, and the USSR had agreed to give more scholarships for Ghanaian students.

After Soviet-Ghanaian economic talks it was stated that discussions would later be held on concluding a long-term trade agreement "which, in particular, will envisage the USSR's annually buying cocoa beans in Ghana, the volume of these purchases to be raised to some 60,000 tons a year by the end of a five-year period". The Soviet Government was prepared to grant Ghana an additional long-term credit for the expenses of Soviet organizations constructing industrial and other undertakings in Ghana, and also for training centres in Ghana (PRAVDA 25.7.61).

President Abbud's Visit to the USSR

President Ibrahim Abbud of the Sudan visited the Soviet Union, at the invitation of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, from 17th to 27th July.

Brezhnev, welcoming President Abbud at Vnukovo airport, praised the Sudanese people's heroic struggle for national liberation, the Sudan's

foreign policy of neutrality and non-adherence to military blocs, and its leading role in support of African countries fighting against colonialism. In reply President Abbud paid tribute to the Soviet Union "for the support which it is giving to the cause of freedom and independence, in the struggle against imperialism, guided by principles proclaimed by your leaders at the dawn of the Revolution, principles which have become obligatory for the world after their approval by the UN General Assembly". President Abbud said he had come to the USSR not only to strengthen friendly relations but also to exchange thoughts about strengthening peace "and the creation of a happy life for all people on earth". To safeguard political independence a peace-loving policy of non-participation in blocs was necessary. "We also consider that political independence is the means to safeguard economic and social development, which can be achieved only through industrialization, aimed against the designs of the monopolies which wish to preserve Africa for themselves as a raw material base. We note with satisfaction the Soviet Union's steps in this direction, and follow with great admiration its successes, achieved thanks to your great Revolution, in all fields of life, and in particular in science, where your achievements border on a miracle. We are confident that your successes will also bear fruit in the economic development of various countries and in course of time will help in putting an end to differences now existing between the groups of human society." (PRAVDA 18.7.61)

On 18th July the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government gave a luncheon in the Kremlin for President Abbud. Talks were held in the Kremlin on 19th July, and on the same day President Abbud gave a luncheon for Soviet leaders in the Sudanese Embassy. On 20th July President Abbud left for Tashkent. On 22nd July he left for Sochi, where he was met by Khrushchev, who gave a dinner for him in the evening at which speeches were exchanged on the subject of the common principles underlying the foreign policies of the Sudan and the Soviet Union. On 23rd July President Abbud left for Leningrad; the next day he spent sightseeing in Leningrad; and on 25th July he returned to Moscow, where the Soviet-Sudanese talks were resumed, and President Abbud gave a reception for Soviet leaders. On 26th July the Supreme Soviet and Soviet Government gave a reception for President Abbud, and on the same day a joint Soviet-Sudanese communique was signed. This expressed community of views on the questions of disarmament; the need to implement the UN declaration on colonialism; Angola, the Congo, Algeria and Tunisia; and racial discrimination in South Africa, Mozambique, Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The talks had "provided the foundations for cooperation in economic and cultural exchanges". The Soviet Goverment "agreed to give economic and technical assistance in the construction of a number of industrial projects in the Republic of the Sudan and in organizing the training of skilled workers and technicians". Khrushchev accepted an invitation from President Abbud to visit the Sudan.

It was announced in the Soviet press on 1st September that Brezhnev would arrive in the Sudan on 14th November.

Tunisia

Soviet press treatment of the Bizerta crisis has been more restrained than might have been expected. Reports on the fighting were full and detailed, and the Tunisian case was faithfully presented without exaggeration, but Soviet newspapers did not present the same picture of Soviet popular fervour in support of a nation fighting against "colonialists" as was exhibited, for instance, in the case of the Congo and Angola.

Before the outbreak of fighting, Soviet reports spoke of the "battle for evacuation" of the Bizerta base and the determined attitude of the thousands of volunteers who were arriving to invest the base (TRUD 16.7.61). Reports on the initial clash noted that Tunisian anti-aircraft artillery had opened fire on French parachutists, but also stated that French aircraft had bombed Tunisian positions (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 20.7.61). Subsequent reports, under headlines such as "French aggression in Tunisia", "Crime in Bizerta", etc., were mainly based on Tunis-Afrique Presse reports, and in the absence of Soviet newspaper correspondents in Tunis PRAVDA published reports from its Rabat correspondent N. Prozhogin. PRAVDA published no editorial or other general comment on the conflict, but IZVESTIYA and TRUD published short articles claiming that Bizerta as a NATO base was a threat to the freedom of the African peoples. IZVESTIYA said that the French wanted to use Bizerta for a flanking operation against the Algerians.

In a dispatch after the cease-fire N. Prozhogin (PRAVDA 27.7.61) denounced Western attempts to produce a compromise "and in effect to keep the Bizerta military base for France and through her for NATO". Hammarskjoeld's mission to Bizerta had this aim - "not so much to liquidate the crisis as to incline the Tunisian Government to acquiescence in the presence of the colonialist forces". The Tunisians, said Prozhogin, had seen how in their country's hour of trial out of the five permanent members of the Security Council only the Soviet Union had supported Tunisia in her complaint against French aggression; as the Tunisian newspaper AS-SABAH had pointed out, their sufferings had shown them their true friends and the true face of their enemies who had masqueraded as friends.

An exception to the rather small-scale publicity which the Soviet press has given to the Bizerta crisis was PRAVDA's publication (28 and 19.8.61) of a long day-by-day report on the conflict by Madeline Riffo, illustrated by photographs of Tunisian dead, which had appeared in HUMANITE and was issued in Paris as a brochure. It occupied three columns in each of the two issues of PRAVDA.

Soviet solidarity with the people of Tunisia was expressed in a statement by the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee (PRAVDA 23.7.61); a message from the Soviet Council of Trade Unions to the Tunisian General Union of Workers (PRAVDA 28.7.61); and a protest to the UN Organization

by the Soviet Council of Trade Unions (TRUD 18.8.61). TRUD also published other messages of support on 18th August, the "day of international solidarity with the workers and people of Tunisia against colonial aggression and for the immediate evacuation of the French forces from Bizerta", but the day does not appear to have been noticed in other Soviet newspapers.

PRAVDA (18.8.61) published a message addressed "to the President of the Soviet Parliament" by Jeluli Fares, the President of the Tunisian National Assembly, expressing the Tunisian view of the French actions and calling on "your respected parliament to denounce the French aggression and to express solidarity with the Tunisian people, fighting in defence of their sovereignty and for the preservation of peace". A reply from the Presidents of the Council of the Union and the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet assured the Tunisian people of the full support of all Soviet people for their struggle.

On 31st July Khrushchev received the diplomatic representatives of the UAR, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, the Sudan, Tunisia, Mali, Somalia and Ethiopia, who informed him of their governments' view of the French action. Khrushchev explained the Soviet Union's attitude in the matter and in general towards the efforts of African and other states to strengthen their independence and liquidate foreign bases in their territories; he expressed his sympathy and condolences for Tunisia's losses "as a result of the aggression of the French colonialists". (PRAVDA 1.8.61)

The Tunisian Foreign Minister Dr. Muqaddam visited Moscow on a special mission on 2nd August. He had talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and was received by Khrushchev on 5th August. He conveyed to Khrushchev an invitation from Bourguiba to visit Tunisia, which Khrushchev accepted (PRAVDA 6.8.61).

Algeria

There was little Soviet press comment on Algerian developments during the period under review. The changes in the FLN leadership were briefly reported in PRAVDA (28.8.61), but no comment on them appeared in the Soviet press during this period.

PRAVDA (17.7.61) published an interview given by Krim Belkacem to its Cairo correspondent I. Belyayev. Krim Belkacem explained the attitude of the FLN side in the Evian talks and its main demands which the French side had rejected; on these demands, he said, the Algerian side could not yield, but he affirmed that "to achieve our aims we are ready to resume talks with France at any time and in any place". He expressed particular gratitude to PRAVDA for helping the cause of Algerian freedom by "drawing the attention of world public opinion to the Algerian people's struggle".

Unlike the Evian talks, the resumed Franco-Algerian talks in Lugrin occasioned no particular comment in the Soviet press. A statement by Krim Belkacem on the reasons for the breakdown of the talks was briefly reported in PRAVDA (4.8.61).

A Tass dispatch from Tunis (SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA 27.8.61) reported the ceremony in Tunis at which the Soviet Ambassador to Tunisia handed over to FLN representatives 3,000 tons of wheat and 250 tons of dried peas, the gift of the Soviet people to Algerian refugees and wounded. IZVESTIYA (27.8.61) reported that the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee had decided to give to the Algerian Red Crescent committee medical supplies to the value of 10,000 rubles.

Other Countries

Morocco A Tass dispatch from Rabat (TRUD 19.7.61) stated that "the strike movement of Moroccan artisans, demanding improvement of their living conditions and protection from cruel exploitation by big middlemen and capitalists, is assuming ever greater proportions". On the previous day artisans of Casablanca, Marrakesh, Tetuan and other towns had declared a general strike in solidarity with Fez shoe-makers who were on strike. In Casablanca the police had twice fired on a meeting of strikers, wounding a number, and strike leaders had been arrested. KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA (13.8.61) reported that workers of an artificial fertilizer factory in the suburbs of Casablanca had obtained an increase of pay, after a 12-day strike. The transport workers had announced a general strike in the principal towns of Morocco on 16th-18th August if their economic demands were not met.

TRUD (25.7.61) quoted an article in AL-MUKAFIH demanding the evacuation of US bases in Morocco, as "threatening the security and independence of the country, as well as world peace".

KOMMUNIST TADZHIKISTANA (28.7.61) published a long report on the four-day visit of Ali Yata, Secretary of the Moroccan Communist Party, to Tadzhikistan. It was stated that Ali Yata was on holiday in the Soviet Union.

Nigeria A Tass dispatch from London (PRAVDA 6.9.61) reported a speech made by Mr. Awolowo at a students' meeting in which he demanded the abrogation of the Anglo-Nigerian defence agreement. He had said that British air force personnel were already in Nigeria, that at Kano airport British soldiers kept a 24-hour guard on the control tower, and that secret NATO radio transmitters were operating in most of the regions of Nigeria.

Togo A delegation from the Togo women's union, visiting the USSR on the invitation of the Committee of Soviet women, arrived in Kirgiziya on a three days' visit on 4th September (SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA 7.9.61).

Senegal The Soviet Government has invited Mamadou Dia, the President of the Council of Ministers of Senegal, to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union. The date is to be fixed later (PRAVDA 5.9.61).

Fadilou Diop, a "leading public figure" of the Republic of Senegal, arrived in Tadzhikistan on 10th August. He was visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Society for Friendship and Cultural Links with Foreign Countries, and "had been an honoured guest at the World Youth Forum in Moscow". (Note: Soviet press reports on statements made by delegates at the World Youth Forum in Moscow, at which Africa was strongly represented, were voluminous, and it has not been practicable to deal with them in this issue.)

PRAVDA (26.7.61) published a comment by HUMANITE on the conclusion of the trial of Mahjmout Diop and Ouada Madika, leaders of the (Marxist) Parti Africain de l'Independance. Mahjmout Diop, who had been under arrest since July last year, was released, and Ouada Madika was acquitted, on a charge of killing a policeman and "violating the freedom of the elections". According to HUMANITE, there were great popular demonstrations of sympathy with the accused, whose release was "a setback for the neo-colonialists".

Mali A Mali delegation led by T. Angadumbo, the Major of Gao, left Moscow for home on 29th August after a three weeks' visit to the Soviet Union during which they visited Moscow, Leningrad and Kazakhstan (PRAVDA 30.8.61). A delegation of Mali journalists, invited to the Soviet Union by the Soviet Union of Journalists, visited Tashkent, Baku and Sochi and returned home on 31st August (BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY 27.8.61; TRUD 1.9.61).

IZVESTIYA quoted (9.9.61) a statement by the Union Soudanaise acclaiming the evacuation of the last French military base in Mali, and (27.8.61) a statement by President Modibo Keita (reported from Bamako by the New China News Agency) defining Mali's foreign policy and attitude towards African liberation movements.

Niger Brezhnev sent a message of congratulations to President Hamani Diori on the first anniversary of Niger's independence.

Central African Republic Brezhnev sent a message of congratulations to President David Dacko on the first anniversary of the independence of the

Central African Republic. He expressed the hope that the Republic's second year would be a year of "further strengthening of its independence and the development of good relations between the peoples of our two countries".

Congo (Brazzaville) Brezhnev sent a message of congratulations to President Fulbert Youlou on the first anniversary of the independence of the Republic of Congo.

A government delegation from Brazzaville led by the Minister of Planning Massambat-Debat arrived in Moscow on 6th September (PRAVDA 7.9.61).

Somalia PRAVDA (12.9.61) reported the arrival in Mogadishu of a group of Soviet specialists to study questions related to the development projects envisaged in the recent Soviet-Somali agreement.

Kenya Soviet newspapers welcomed Kenyatta's release with short but enthusiastic reports and comments. PRAVDA (7.8.61) published a short biographical note on Kenyatta. The Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee issued a statement congratulating the people of Kenya on Kenyatta's release (IZVESTIYA 19.8.61). The Soviet press is now beginning to pay more attention to the Kenya situation, as is shown in a fairly long article in IZVESTIYA (21.7.61) which, after the usual Soviet calumnies against the British administration, informed the Soviet reader that the two main African parties in Kenya had agreed to demand independence for Kenya by the end of this year.

Rhodesia and Nyasaland Soviet newspapers published short reports on the disturbances in Northern Rhodesia in connection with the new Constitution; PRAVDA (14.8.61) quoted REYNOLDS NEWS for the statement that the situation was "close to civil war".

The victory of the Malawi Congress Party in the Nyasaland elections was reported by IZVESTIYA (17.8.61) under the heading "Defeat for Racialists".

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